Abitur Hessen Geschichte 2022 · GK · bilingual Englisch

World War I in historical perspective

Material

The Independent: Memories of the First World War (2014)

The editorial in the British newspaper The Independent was published on 3 August, 2014, the 100 th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I.

“Futile” is the word perhaps most often associated with the First World War – as much now as in its

immediate aftermath. It has gone in and out of fashion, so to speak. In the 1930s the feeling of “never

again” was so powerful that it drove the left in politics towards pacifism and the right towards

appeasement, with results that are still working themselves through. […]

5 A hundred years on, our perspective on the Great War has a more balanced feel. The school of thought

that believes the British Empire would have been better off, materially and politically, if it had let the

Continentals get on with it and reneged 1 on its guarantee of Belgian independence is, as yet, an

eccentric minority view.

Some have made much of the comparatively muted commemorations in Germany. Yet they too seem

10 to have the Kaiser’s War framed in the correct way. They refer to it as the urkatastrophe, the appalling

origins of Hitlerism, the Holocaust, the division of Germany itself in the Cold War and every kind of

evil. While facing up to their shameful past, it is understandable that Germans should prefer to look to

the future.

In his hefty War Memoirs, published in the 1930s, the former war-time minister of munitions and

15 Prime Minister David Lloyd George wrote of 1914: “Nations slithered over the brink into the boiling

cauldron 2 of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay.” That is a useful lesson to learn. As

some historians have pointed out, one of the mysteries of that hot diplomatic summer was how little

the telephone was used and how easily signals among the different Great Powers were misunderstood,

occasionally wilfully.

20 Some of that is true today. Russia and the West seem to be perpetually misunderstanding each other’s

true position […].

That is why […] it is important to try to keep some sort of dialogue alive, even if the messages have to

be passed through back channels and intermediaries. If nothing else, we may as well remember how

the experience of near destruction in the Second World War shaped Russia’s peculiar and suspicious

25 view of the outside world right up to the present day. […]

The Great War, it is becoming accepted, was not itself a “bad” or unjust war, from the Allies’ point of

view, at any rate. It was fought against militarism and aggression and to protect the sovereignty of

small states as well as the integrity of British power. What went wrong was the bad peace that

followed.

30 The Versailles settlement was born of the same forces that drove Europe and the world to war five

years earlier – vengefulness and nationalism. It was such a flawed 3, vindictive peace […] that a second

round of Europe’s civil war would break out barely two decades later.

The machinery of resolving international conflicts – which will always arise – was the League of

Nations, which failed almost as soon as it began. It was designed to replace a world of secret treaties

35 and imperial aggression, and was itself replaced by the United Nations. The UN has not failed as badly

as the League, but the same factors that were at work then are balefully 4 present today, including

cynical manipulation of the organisation by superpowers guarding short-term national interests rather

than the long-term interests of global harmony. So maybe not so much has changed in a century.

The Independent: Memories of the First World War, URL: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/memories-of-the-first-world-war-1914-to-2014-9645332.html?origin=internalSearch (abgerufen am 14.02.2021).

1 to renege on sth. – sich nicht an etw. halten

2 cauldron – Hexenkessel, hier: Unruheherd

3 flawed – fehlerhaft

4 baleful – bedrohlich

1

Summarize the text. (Material)

[30 BE]

2

Explain how alliances and Great Power relations in Europe after 1890 contributed to the outbreak of World War I, taking the text as a starting point.

[35 BE]

World War I in historical perspective

Material

The Independent: Memories of the First World War (2014)

The editorial in the British newspaper The Independent was published on 3 August, 2014, the 100 th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I.

“Futile” is the word perhaps most often associated with the First World War – as much now as in its

immediate aftermath. It has gone in and out of fashion, so to speak. In the 1930s the feeling of “never

again” was so powerful that it drove the left in politics towards pacifism and the right towards

appeasement, with results that are still working themselves through. […]

5 A hundred years on, our perspective on the Great War has a more balanced feel. The school of thought

that believes the British Empire would have been better off, materially and politically, if it had let the

Continentals get on with it and reneged 1 on its guarantee of Belgian independence is, as yet, an

eccentric minority view.

Some have made much of the comparatively muted commemorations in Germany. Yet they too seem

10 to have the Kaiser’s War framed in the correct way. They refer to it as the urkatastrophe, the appalling

origins of Hitlerism, the Holocaust, the division of Germany itself in the Cold War and every kind of

evil. While facing up to their shameful past, it is understandable that Germans should prefer to look to

the future.

In his hefty War Memoirs, published in the 1930s, the former war-time minister of munitions and

15 Prime Minister David Lloyd George wrote of 1914: “Nations slithered over the brink into the boiling

cauldron 2 of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay.” That is a useful lesson to learn. As

some historians have pointed out, one of the mysteries of that hot diplomatic summer was how little

the telephone was used and how easily signals among the different Great Powers were misunderstood,

occasionally wilfully.

20 Some of that is true today. Russia and the West seem to be perpetually misunderstanding each other’s

true position […].

That is why […] it is important to try to keep some sort of dialogue alive, even if the messages have to

be passed through back channels and intermediaries. If nothing else, we may as well remember how

the experience of near destruction in the Second World War shaped Russia’s peculiar and suspicious

25 view of the outside world right up to the present day. […]

The Great War, it is becoming accepted, was not itself a “bad” or unjust war, from the Allies’ point of

view, at any rate. It was fought against militarism and aggression and to protect the sovereignty of

small states as well as the integrity of British power. What went wrong was the bad peace that

followed.

30 The Versailles settlement was born of the same forces that drove Europe and the world to war five

years earlier – vengefulness and nationalism. It was such a flawed 3, vindictive peace […] that a second

round of Europe’s civil war would break out barely two decades later.

The machinery of resolving international conflicts – which will always arise – was the League of

Nations, which failed almost as soon as it began. It was designed to replace a world of secret treaties

35 and imperial aggression, and was itself replaced by the United Nations. The UN has not failed as badly

as the League, but the same factors that were at work then are balefully 4 present today, including

cynical manipulation of the organisation by superpowers guarding short-term national interests rather

than the long-term interests of global harmony. So maybe not so much has changed in a century.

The Independent: Memories of the First World War, URL: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/memories-of-the-first-world-war-1914-to-2014-9645332.html?origin=internalSearch (abgerufen am 14.02.2021).

1 to renege on sth. – sich nicht an etw. halten

2 cauldron – Hexenkessel, hier: Unruheherd

3 flawed – fehlerhaft

4 baleful – bedrohlich

3

Discuss to what extent the Versailles Peace Treaty was “a flawed, vindictive peace” (Material).

[35 BE]

Material

Rogers, Foerster, Schwarz: Aspects of German political institutions (1932)

An essay by three political scientists of Columbia University (Lindsay Rogers, Freda Foerster, Sanford Schwarz), published in the American journal "Political Science Quarterly" in September 1932.

It is accurate to say that down to 1932 the system [of Weimar] worked well – extremely well considering the newness of the institutions and the difficulties by which they were confronted. [...]

Those who drafted the Weimar Constitution were able to choose the kind of executive authority they desired. [...]

5 [T]he German people were accustomed to authoritarianism and during the revolutionary transition a

strong executive power was almost indispensable. The number of political parties, moreover, made it

clear that cabinets would be unstable and would undergo frequent changes. Hence it seemed desirable

to have a head of state who would continue from administration to administration; who could be above

parties, and exercise a mediating influence. Consequently, a president was decided upon, and the

10 question then was whether he should be elected by the Chambers 1, as in France, or by the whole

people, as in the United States. The decision was for popular election. [...]

Since 1919 [...] the composition of the Reichstag has enabled the president of the Reich to make full

use of his authority. Coalitions have been necessary, for the Reichstag has always been segmented into

parties no one of which approached a majority. Five elections have done no more than shift the

15 balance of parties and permit a choice between three coalitions: the so-called Great Coalition including

all but the extremists; a smaller coalition going Right from the Center to the German People's Party

and Left to the Democrats (not the Social Democrats); the Weimar Coalition of the Left extending

from the Social Democrats to and including the Center.

It is not unnatural, therefore, that leaving out of account the two provisional cabinets of Ebert,

20 Germany has had nineteen cabinets in thirteen years. [...]

Historians sometimes suggest that certain statesmen have continued their activities at the price of their

reputations: that having finished particular jobs brilliantly, they should have retired. To this principle,

however, President von Hindenburg is a striking exception.

In 1915 he was the legendary hero of Tannenberg 2 – the maker of Germany's first success against

25 Russia. During the later years of the war, he was a symbol of the Prussianism against which the Allies

were fighting. What would the Allied cartoonists have done without him? In 1925, when he was

elected president of the Reich, he was almost universally regarded as a portent 3 of monarchical or

Fascist reaction. Few commentators saw in his election a possible bulwark of the Weimar republic

because the principal anti-republican symbol would be henceforth pledged to support republican

30 institutions. For seven years, however, Hindenburg was the chief support of the republic. He took his

oath of office seriously. He strove to have cabinets which would procure the broadest possible backing

from the Reichstag. He seemed to have no objections to a Socialist chancellor, and was willing loyally

to support him. In 1932, when he stood for reëlection, Hindenburg was opposed by the extreme Right

and the extreme Left – by reaction and by Communism – and other countries hailed his reëlection as a

35 republican triumph. Yet a few weeks later he dismissed the chancellor who had contributed largely to,

if indeed he did not make possible, that triumph, and his act certainly made the continuance of

parliamentary government more difficult.

Lindsay Rogers, Freda Foerster, Sanford Schwarz: Aspects of German political institutions, in: Political Science Quarterly, Band 47, Nr. 3, 1932, S. 321 ff.

1 Chambers of Parliament

2 Hindenburg was the commander of the German army that defeated the Russian troops in the Battle of Tannenberg (East Prussia), which actually took place in August 1914.

3 portent of – ein Zeichen für

The Political System of Weimar

1

Outline the authors' reasoning. (Material) (30 BE)

Material

Rogers, Foerster, Schwarz: Aspects of German political institutions (1932)

An essay by three political scientists of Columbia University (Lindsay Rogers, Freda Foerster, Sanford Schwarz), published in the American journal "Political Science Quarterly" in September 1932.

It is accurate to say that down to 1932 the system [of Weimar] worked well – extremely well considering the newness of the institutions and the difficulties by which they were confronted. [...]

Those who drafted the Weimar Constitution were able to choose the kind of executive authority they desired. [...]

5 [T]he German people were accustomed to authoritarianism and during the revolutionary transition a

strong executive power was almost indispensable. The number of political parties, moreover, made it

clear that cabinets would be unstable and would undergo frequent changes. Hence it seemed desirable

to have a head of state who would continue from administration to administration; who could be above

parties, and exercise a mediating influence. Consequently, a president was decided upon, and the

10 question then was whether he should be elected by the Chambers 1, as in France, or by the whole

people, as in the United States. The decision was for popular election. [...]

Since 1919 [...] the composition of the Reichstag has enabled the president of the Reich to make full

use of his authority. Coalitions have been necessary, for the Reichstag has always been segmented into

parties no one of which approached a majority. Five elections have done no more than shift the

15 balance of parties and permit a choice between three coalitions: the so-called Great Coalition including

all but the extremists; a smaller coalition going Right from the Center to the German People's Party

and Left to the Democrats (not the Social Democrats); the Weimar Coalition of the Left extending

from the Social Democrats to and including the Center.

It is not unnatural, therefore, that leaving out of account the two provisional cabinets of Ebert,

20 Germany has had nineteen cabinets in thirteen years. [...]

Historians sometimes suggest that certain statesmen have continued their activities at the price of their

reputations: that having finished particular jobs brilliantly, they should have retired. To this principle,

however, President von Hindenburg is a striking exception.

In 1915 he was the legendary hero of Tannenberg 2 – the maker of Germany's first success against

25 Russia. During the later years of the war, he was a symbol of the Prussianism against which the Allies

were fighting. What would the Allied cartoonists have done without him? In 1925, when he was

elected president of the Reich, he was almost universally regarded as a portent 3 of monarchical or

Fascist reaction. Few commentators saw in his election a possible bulwark of the Weimar republic

because the principal anti-republican symbol would be henceforth pledged to support republican

30 institutions. For seven years, however, Hindenburg was the chief support of the republic. He took his

oath of office seriously. He strove to have cabinets which would procure the broadest possible backing

from the Reichstag. He seemed to have no objections to a Socialist chancellor, and was willing loyally

to support him. In 1932, when he stood for reëlection, Hindenburg was opposed by the extreme Right

and the extreme Left – by reaction and by Communism – and other countries hailed his reëlection as a

35 republican triumph. Yet a few weeks later he dismissed the chancellor who had contributed largely to,

if indeed he did not make possible, that triumph, and his act certainly made the continuance of

parliamentary government more difficult.

Lindsay Rogers, Freda Foerster, Sanford Schwarz: Aspects of German political institutions, in: Political Science Quarterly, Band 47, Nr. 3, 1932, S. 321 ff.

1 Chambers of Parliament

2 Hindenburg was the commander of the German army that defeated the Russian troops in the Battle of Tannenberg (East Prussia), which actually took place in August 1914.

3 portent of – ein Zeichen für

The Political System of Weimar

2

According to the authors, "the German people were accustomed to authoritarianism" (Material).

Explain this assumption by referring to Germany in the 19 th century. (40 BE)

Material

Rogers, Foerster, Schwarz: Aspects of German political institutions (1932)

An essay by three political scientists of Columbia University (Lindsay Rogers, Freda Foerster, Sanford Schwarz), published in the American journal "Political Science Quarterly" in September 1932.

It is accurate to say that down to 1932 the system [of Weimar] worked well – extremely well considering the newness of the institutions and the difficulties by which they were confronted. [...]

Those who drafted the Weimar Constitution were able to choose the kind of executive authority they desired. [...]

5 [T]he German people were accustomed to authoritarianism and during the revolutionary transition a

strong executive power was almost indispensable. The number of political parties, moreover, made it

clear that cabinets would be unstable and would undergo frequent changes. Hence it seemed desirable

to have a head of state who would continue from administration to administration; who could be above

parties, and exercise a mediating influence. Consequently, a president was decided upon, and the

10 question then was whether he should be elected by the Chambers 1, as in France, or by the whole

people, as in the United States. The decision was for popular election. [...]

Since 1919 [...] the composition of the Reichstag has enabled the president of the Reich to make full

use of his authority. Coalitions have been necessary, for the Reichstag has always been segmented into

parties no one of which approached a majority. Five elections have done no more than shift the

15 balance of parties and permit a choice between three coalitions: the so-called Great Coalition including

all but the extremists; a smaller coalition going Right from the Center to the German People's Party

and Left to the Democrats (not the Social Democrats); the Weimar Coalition of the Left extending

from the Social Democrats to and including the Center.

It is not unnatural, therefore, that leaving out of account the two provisional cabinets of Ebert,

20 Germany has had nineteen cabinets in thirteen years. [...]

Historians sometimes suggest that certain statesmen have continued their activities at the price of their

reputations: that having finished particular jobs brilliantly, they should have retired. To this principle,

however, President von Hindenburg is a striking exception.

In 1915 he was the legendary hero of Tannenberg 2 – the maker of Germany's first success against

25 Russia. During the later years of the war, he was a symbol of the Prussianism against which the Allies

were fighting. What would the Allied cartoonists have done without him? In 1925, when he was

elected president of the Reich, he was almost universally regarded as a portent 3 of monarchical or

Fascist reaction. Few commentators saw in his election a possible bulwark of the Weimar republic

because the principal anti-republican symbol would be henceforth pledged to support republican

30 institutions. For seven years, however, Hindenburg was the chief support of the republic. He took his

oath of office seriously. He strove to have cabinets which would procure the broadest possible backing

from the Reichstag. He seemed to have no objections to a Socialist chancellor, and was willing loyally

to support him. In 1932, when he stood for reëlection, Hindenburg was opposed by the extreme Right

and the extreme Left – by reaction and by Communism – and other countries hailed his reëlection as a

35 republican triumph. Yet a few weeks later he dismissed the chancellor who had contributed largely to,

if indeed he did not make possible, that triumph, and his act certainly made the continuance of

parliamentary government more difficult.

Lindsay Rogers, Freda Foerster, Sanford Schwarz: Aspects of German political institutions, in: Political Science Quarterly, Band 47, Nr. 3, 1932, S. 321 ff.

1 Chambers of Parliament

2 Hindenburg was the commander of the German army that defeated the Russian troops in the Battle of Tannenberg (East Prussia), which actually took place in August 1914.

3 portent of – ein Zeichen für

The Political System of Weimar

3

Assess the views expressed in the text (Material) concerning the role Hindenburg played in German politics. Take into account events up to his death in August 1934. (30 BE)

Europe before the Second World War

Material: William Dodd: Hitler Aims at War (1935)

Dodd (1869–1940) served as US Ambassador to Berlin from 1933 to 1937, when international tensions grew due to the policy of the German government. The text below is an excerpt from Dodd's diary (4 April, 1935).

1 I received a telegram from Secretary Hull 1 asking whether war in Europe is imminent. I had an engagement with Von Neurath 2 at 12 o’clock to speak about a minor matter. So I decided to see Sir Eric Phipps 3, whose office is near the German Foreign Office, at 11:30. He happened to be free. In the conversation it was made clear that the visits of Sir John Simon 4 and the young Eden 5 had been of

5 negative value.

Hitler had sat in the conference in his brown-shirted S.A. uniform, the others all in civilian clothes. Hitler made it clear he would not agree to the so-called “eastern Locarno pacts” 6 or guarantees of existing boundaries between Germany, Poland, the little Baltic states and Russia. But he said he would not go to war, only insist upon treaties being kept. As to the annexation of Austria, he vowed that there

10 would be no German aggression. However, he insisted on the same right to send help to his cohorts 7 there as the Italians had sent to theirs, both countries being engaged simultaneously in rival propaganda. As to Russian-German co-operation, Hitler said there was no possibility. Most of these points I had telegraphed to Washington. Sir Eric simply confirmed them and indicated once more grave doubts as to the maintenance of peace in Europe. One thing is certain: Hitler aims at war. When

15 he will strike depends on preparations and a proper incident.

At 12:00 I sat down for a talk with Von Neurath. [...] I raised the question of German military policy. I told him first how general is the feeling in the United States that Germany aims to go to war relatively soon. He vowed there is no move toward war. He pretended great concern that Mussolini 8 should have almost doubled the strength of the Italian army by recent orders, also that Mussolini

20 should have published a statement two days ago demanding the encirclement of Germany and blaming England for not uniting with France and Italy to make it possible. [...]

I reminded Von Neurath that all Germans seem military-minded, that all their public demonstrations are in full war equipment. I also said that Germany circulated, widely, imperialistic maps, that is, maps which show that the Nazi leaders demand the annexation of border countries like Holland, Austria,

25 parts of Switzerland and the Polish Corridor. [...]

I said: It convinces the outside world that Germany means to re-apply the old imperialist policy, not unlike that of Theodore Roosevelt 9. Marching everywhere in uniforms and claiming all border areas where German-speaking people live are strong evidences of the war spirit here. The Foreign Minister said: “Imperialistic talk and attitudes worry me too.” The conversation lasted half an hour and it

30 convinced me once more that Von Neurath and perhaps all the higher officials of the Foreign Office are fully aware of the dangers of Hitlerism and that they press for their points of view in vain. Hitler really aims to annex all these areas and will in due time go to war for that purpose.

I came away without any valid assurances, just as I left the British Embassy without being convinced that England was doing anything [...]. The encirclement of Germany is at present not possible and the

35 1914 situation is reproduced in most of its features. Will Europe go to war? I think not in a year or two.

William E. Dodd, Jr. und Charles A. Beard (Hg.): Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933–1938. New York 1941, S. 228 f.

1 Cordell Hull (1871–1955), US Secretary of State from 1933 to 1944.

2 Konstantin von Neurath (1873–1956), German Foreign Minister from 1932 to 1938.

3 Sir Eric Phipps (1875–1945), British Ambassador to Germany from 1933 to 1937.

4 Sir John Simon (1873–1954), British Foreign Secretary from 1931 to 1935.

5 Anthony Eden (1897–1977), British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1931 to 1935.

6 French initiative of the year before, which did not materialize.

7 cohorts – Parteigänger, Anhänger

8 Benito Mussolini (1883–1945), Italian dictator from 1922 to 1943 and antagonist to NS Germany until late 1935.

9 Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919), 26 th President of the United States from 1901 to 1909.

1

Summarize the author’s reasoning. (Material)

[30 BE]

2

Put the source into the context of German foreign policy from 1933 to 1939.

[40 BE]

3

Dodd argues that “the 1914 situation is reproduced in most of its features” (Material). Discuss this statement.

[30 BE]

Material

John H. Herz: The Fiasco of Denazification (1948)

John H. Herz (1908–2005) was a political scientist who had to leave Germany in 1935 as he was Jewish. He eventually became a professor in the USA. The text at hand is an extract from an essay for an American journal.

In order to judge facts and figures correctly, it must be remembered from the outset that denazification constituted a somewhat revolutionary approach to occupation policies, made necessary by the unusual nature of the defeated régime. If the war was to result in the defeat, not only of Germany as a power but of Nazism as a system, the traditional “law and order” principle of military occupation, with its regard for the bulk of the laws and institutions of the occupied country, was of no avail. Since Germans had failed to overthrow the Nazi system by their own force, the victors had to assume the task seeing to it that Nazi organizations were dissolved, Nazi institutions destroyed, Nazi laws abrogated 1, and Nazis themselves eliminated from positions of power and influence. This they proclaimed as their aim at Potsdam […].

[…] The various steps taken to relax the original denazification program [between 1945 and 1948] thus had resulted in the exemption of all but a very small number of Major Offenders 2. As matters had developed, denazification was terminated under such conditions that a premium was given to the “hard core” of major Nazis who had managed to delay their trials in the hope of forthcoming relaxations; most of them now would get away without penalties, in contrast to the bulk of minor Nazis who had been tried earlier. In these circumstances, demands for retroactive amnesty 3 for the latter category will be difficult to refuse. Thus, denazification would result in the total amnesty of all but a handful of Major Offenders. […]

More recent figures confirm the growing infiltration or reinfiltration of Nazis into positions of influence. According to an MG 4 report 60 per cent of Bavarian judges and 76 per cent of Bavarian public prosecutors were former Nazi party members. Even more important than this penetration of appointive positions is the increasing number of elective posts occupied by “denazified” Nazis, as mayors, Landräte, and so on. In such positions, backed by the confidence of a majority of the public (most of the temporarily disenfranchised 5 Nazis have by now regained the ballot), they have full opportunity to apply their policies and standards in day-by-day administration, in appointing and dismissing, favoring and disfavoring, without having to be overly afraid of interference by higher authorities. Thus a policy of “democratizing” Germany, through making key positions elective and entrusting Germans with the right to vote and to elect on an ever broader scale and through failing to eliminate Nazis from participation in these processes, has simply delivered the fragile new democracy to the tender mercies of its enemies.

In conclusion, the effect of denazification appears to have been to bar certain persons temporarily from positions of influence rather than to provide for their definitive or long-term elimination.

John H. Herz: The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany, in: Political Science Quarterly 63 (1948), S. 569–594.

1 to abrogate – außer Kraft setzen

2 The Major Offenders were convicted in the Nuremberg Trial 1945/46.

3 amnesty – Amnestie, Straffreiheit

4 MG – Military Government (of the US zone)

5 disenfranchised – entrechtet

Denazification in Germany

1

Delineate the position the author expresses. (Material) (30 BE)

3

Assess the short-term and long-term effects of Allied policies towards Germany between 1945 and 1949. (35 BE)

Material

John H. Herz: The Fiasco of Denazification (1948)

John H. Herz (1908–2005) was a political scientist who had to leave Germany in 1935 as he was Jewish. He eventually became a professor in the USA. The text at hand is an extract from an essay for an American journal.

In order to judge facts and figures correctly, it must be remembered from the outset that denazification constituted a somewhat revolutionary approach to occupation policies, made necessary by the unusual nature of the defeated régime. If the war was to result in the defeat, not only of Germany as a power but of Nazism as a system, the traditional “law and order” principle of military occupation, with its regard for the bulk of the laws and institutions of the occupied country, was of no avail. Since Germans had failed to overthrow the Nazi system by their own force, the victors had to assume the task seeing to it that Nazi organizations were dissolved, Nazi institutions destroyed, Nazi laws abrogated 1, and Nazis themselves eliminated from positions of power and influence. This they proclaimed as their aim at Potsdam […].

[…] The various steps taken to relax the original denazification program [between 1945 and 1948] thus had resulted in the exemption of all but a very small number of Major Offenders 2. As matters had developed, denazification was terminated under such conditions that a premium was given to the “hard core” of major Nazis who had managed to delay their trials in the hope of forthcoming relaxations; most of them now would get away without penalties, in contrast to the bulk of minor Nazis who had been tried earlier. In these circumstances, demands for retroactive amnesty 3 for the latter category will be difficult to refuse. Thus, denazification would result in the total amnesty of all but a handful of Major Offenders. […]

More recent figures confirm the growing infiltration or reinfiltration of Nazis into positions of influence. According to an MG 4 report 60 per cent of Bavarian judges and 76 per cent of Bavarian public prosecutors were former Nazi party members. Even more important than this penetration of appointive positions is the increasing number of elective posts occupied by “denazified” Nazis, as mayors, Landräte, and so on. In such positions, backed by the confidence of a majority of the public (most of the temporarily disenfranchised 5 Nazis have by now regained the ballot), they have full opportunity to apply their policies and standards in day-by-day administration, in appointing and dismissing, favoring and disfavoring, without having to be overly afraid of interference by higher authorities. Thus a policy of “democratizing” Germany, through making key positions elective and entrusting Germans with the right to vote and to elect on an ever broader scale and through failing to eliminate Nazis from participation in these processes, has simply delivered the fragile new democracy to the tender mercies of its enemies.

In conclusion, the effect of denazification appears to have been to bar certain persons temporarily from positions of influence rather than to provide for their definitive or long-term elimination.

John H. Herz: The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany, in: Political Science Quarterly 63 (1948), S. 569–594.

1 to abrogate – außer Kraft setzen

2 The Major Offenders were convicted in the Nuremberg Trial 1945/46.

3 amnesty – Amnestie, Straffreiheit

4 MG – Military Government (of the US zone)

5 disenfranchised – entrechtet

Denazification in Germany

2

Explain the political and social factors due to which the Germans “failed to overthrow the Nazi system by their own force” (Material). Refer to the period of 1933 to 1939. (35 BE)