Abitur NRW Geschichte 2021 · GK · Haupttermin · bilingual Englisch

Abiturprüfung 2021 · Geschichte bilingual-englisch, Grundkurs

Aufgabenstellung · GE BIL E GK HT 1

Materialgrundlage

Frederick D. Lugard: The Extension of British Influence (and Trade) in Africa.

(Rechtschreibung und Hervorhebungen wie im Original)

Hinweise zum Autor und zum Material:

Frederick John Dealtry Lugard (1858 – 1945) made a career in the colonial services, starting out as a mercenary and explorer, later serving in high offices in Africa (especially in Nigeria) and Asia.

The text is the published version of a speech originally delivered before the mostly aristocratic members of the Royal Colonial Institute on 12th November 1895.

Royal Colonial Institute: A highly influential interest group founded in 1868 to promote colonial interests, presided over by the Prince of Wales.

[...]

Fourteen hundred years before Christ the contribution of Africa to the world’s wealth was summarised in three items – ivory, apes, and peacocks, 1 though whether the allusion is indeed to Africa seems doubtful, the more so that peacocks are not found on the continent. Fourteen hundred years after Christ (or a century or two more) apes and peacocks had ceased to be a demand of civilisation, and two items sufficed to indicate the main output of Africa, viz. 2 “black and white ivory” – slaves and elephant tusks. Between these two epochs, it is true, there had been a period of comparative activity in the north, but of steady and permanent progress throughout the continent there remained no trace, and it seemed as though the shadow of a curse brooded over the continent [...]. During these thirty centuries, of which we have some historical record, nations arose and decayed and passed away; Assyria and the Mogul empires in the East, 3 Greece and Rome in the West, but Africa remained a closed continent. Egypt and Carthage 4 alone claim a place in the history of the nations, but neither the one nor the other was of the race and blood of the negroid tribes which peopled the continent and still people it to-day. It is to these settlers on the northern temperate coast of Africa that we owe our earliest records of the continent. [...] But until the latter half of the present century little more was known of the interior than was known in the time of Solomon, or of Herodotus, 5 and the Sphinx still looked out, as through the ages that had passed, over an unknown desert – the barrier which guarded the secrets of an unknown land.

The contrast between the map of Africa as we knew it in our childhood and as we see it to-day is sufficiently striking. The tabula rasa has become a sheet almost as closely filled with lakes and rivers, with mountains and towns, as a map of Europe itself. Above all, we find that it is partitioned off into areas assigned to the various Powers of Europe. There are but few boundaries still left undetermined, and though in respect of these 6 there are doubtless rivalries and jealousies between the Powers concerned, on the whole the partition of Africa has been accomplished with a minimum of friction, and no differences between the civilised powers which it has been beyond the power of diplomacy to eliminate. Nor yet has this partition given rise to much bloodshed in the continent itself. Wars there have been and there are. [...] But for the most part these conflicts have been with the forces of unrest – the alien slave-raiders, 7 or the fierce and cruel tribes who, for the moment, held the dominant power and misused it to slaughter and enslave their weaker neighbours. In no country, at no epoch of the world that I can recall, has the advent of civilisation in a barbarous land been marked by less gratuitous bloodshed.

It is essential to bear in mind that this annexation of Africa by the white races was no outcome of missionary or philanthropic zeal. It was the natural overflow of the nations of Europe into the waste places of the earth, following the law which has guided and, indeed, formed the history of the world. In the nineteenth century, moreover, there has been a new propelling influence at work, over and above that blind impulse which prompts a certain proportion of the manhood of civilised nations to wander forth into less civilised lands. The impulse to which I allude is to some extent distinct from that which forces the emigration of surplus population from the congested cities of Europe, and it is the direct result of the great trade rivalry and commercial warfare which has followed the cheapening of transport – by the introduction of steam. In our own case the hostile tariffs imposed by other nations upon our industries, the competition of foreign-made goods, and the depression of trade, have driven us to seek new markets and new fields for our surplus energy. Settlers driven to seek their fortunes in new Colonies, by motives such as these, do not embark for Africa with the primary object of benefiting the natives, but of benefiting themselves; nor am I by any means sure that hard-headed industrious settlers, bent on succeeding in their enterprise for their own sakes, but ready and anxious to accord fair play to the natives, do not do as much good in their way as the professed philanthropist.

And now that Europe has arbitrarily taken possession of Africa, it devolves upon the nations who have undertaken these responsibilities as “hostages to fortune,” to accept the initial burden they involve. Each of the continental nations who have assumed charge of the largest areas – with, perhaps, the exception of Portugal – is spending many hundreds of thousands sterling yearly on its African possessions. [...] We pride ourselves that we make more out of our Colonial possessions, and spend less on them, than any other nation; and the boast is a true one, and the fact is one of which we are rightly proud. [...]

[Joseph Chamberlain] declared 8 that he regarded many of our Colonial possessions in the light of great “undeveloped estates” owned by the nation; that it was to the nation’s interest to expend a certain amount of capital judiciously upon such estates – just as a private landlord would do – with a view to great returns in the future. This constitutes a new departure, and a new and great policy diametrically opposed to that stagnation and laisser faire attitude 9 which for so many years – I had almost said centuries – has marked the official treatment of our over-sea possessions. [...]

1 ivory, apes, and peacocks: reference to 1 Kings 10:22 and 2 Chronicles 9:21, where it says that every three years ships would bring, along with gold and silver, ivory, apes, and peacocks from Phoenicia.

2 viz. (Lat.): videlicet: that is to say, namely.

3 Assyria: a Mesopotamian kingdom of the ancient Near East that collapsed around 600 BC; the Mogul empires: early modern empires stretching from what is today Afghanistan in the west to Bangladesh in the east.

4 Carthage: ancient powerful empire on the coast of northwestern Africa.

5 Solomon: King of Israel (ca. 970 – 931 BC); Herodotus (ca. 484 – ca. 425 BC): an ancient Greek historian widely considered to have been the first writer to have treated historical subjects using a method of systematic investigation.

6 in respect of these: concerning these.

7 the alien slave-raiders: allusion to Arabo-Islamic slave traders, who had been raiding Africa since the 7th century.

8 Joseph Chamberlain, the then newly-appointed Colonial Secretary, in Parliament on 22nd August 1895.

9 laisser faire attitude: (French) to let people do as they choose; an attitude of deliberate abstention from interference.

1.

Analyse the source. [26 Punkte]

2.

Put the source into the framework of (British) New Imperialism [12 Punkte] and characterise how the author sees Africa and Europe in this extract [16 Punkte]. [28 Punkte]

3.

Evaluate the statements made by Lugard. [26 Punkte]

Hinweis: Weitere 20 Punkte werden für die Darstellungsleistung vergeben (Gesamtpunktzahl: 100 Punkte).

Abiturprüfung 2021 · Geschichte bilingual-englisch, Grundkurs

GE BIL E GK HT 2

Aufgabenstellung:

1.

Analyse the source. (26 Punkte)

2.

Put the source into the framework of the peace process (12 Punkte) and compare the author's reflections on the treaty with the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (16 Punkte). (28 Punkte)

3.

Assess the author's stance, additionally considering later developments. (26 Punkte)

Materialgrundlage:

David Lloyd George: Some considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally draft their terms, March 25th, 1919. (Rechtschreibung und Hervorhebungen wie im Original)

Hinweise zum Autor und zum Material: In 1919, David Lloyd George consulted with a team of close advisers in Fontainebleau, near Paris. Although the resulting memorandum was presented to the Peace Conference as a whole, it was primarily addressed to the Prime Minister of France and the President of the United States.

Zugelassene Hilfsmittel: Ein- und zweisprachiges Wörterbuch

1 When nations are exhausted by wars in which they have put forth all their strength and which leave them tired, bleeding and broken, it is not difficult to patch up a peace that may last until the generation which experienced the horrors of the war has passed away. Pictures of heroism and triumph only tempt those who know nothing of the sufferings and terrors of war. It is

5 therefore comparatively easy to patch up a peace which will last for thirty years.

What is difficult, however, is to draw up a peace which will not provoke a fresh struggle when those who have had practical experience of what war means have passed away. History has proved that a peace which has been hailed by a victorious nation as a triumph of diplomatic skill and statesmanship, even of moderation, in the long run has proved itself to be short-

10 sighted and charged with danger to the victor. [...] You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; all the same, in the end, if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors. The impression, the deep impression, made upon the human heart by four years of unexampled slaughter will disappear with the

15 hearts upon which it has been marked by the terrible sword of the Great War. The maintenance of peace will then depend upon there being no causes of exasperation constantly stirring up the spirit of patriotism, of justice or of fair play to achieve redress. Our terms may be severe, they may be stern and even ruthless, but at the same time they can be so just that the country on which they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no right to complain. But injustice,

20 arrogance, displayed in the hour of triumph, will never be forgotten nor forgiven.

For these reasons I am, therefore, strongly averse to transferring more Germans from German rule to the rule of some other nation than can possibly be helped. I can not conceive any greater cause of future war than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world, should be surrounded by a number of

25 small states, many of them consisting of people who have never previously set up a stable government for themselves, but each of them containing large masses of Germans clamoring for reunion with their native land. The proposal of the Polish Commission 1 that we should place 2,100,000 Germans under the control of a people of a different religion and which has never proved its capacity for stable self-government throughout its history, must, in my

30 judgment, lead sooner or later to a new war in the east of Europe. [...]

The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw in her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics whose dream it is to conquer the world for Bolshevism by force of arms. This danger is no mere chimera 2. The present government in Germany is weak; its

35 authority is challenged; it lingers merely because there is no alternative but the Spartacists, and Germany is not ready for Spartacism, as yet. But the argument which the Spartacists are using with great effect at this very time is that they alone can save Germany from the intolerable conditions which have been bequeathed her by the war. They offer to free the German people from indebtedness to the Allies and indebtedness to their own richer classes.

40 They offer them complete control of their own affairs and the prospect of a new heaven and earth. [...]

From every point of view, therefore, it seems to me that we ought to endeavour to draw up a peace settlement as if we were impartial arbiters, forgetful of the passions of the war. This settlement ought to have three ends in view.

45 First of all it must do justice to the Allies, by taking into account Germany's responsibility for the origin of the War, and for the way in which it was fought.

Secondly, it must be a settlement which a responsible German Government can sign in the belief that it can fulfil the obligations it incurs.

Thirdly, it must be a settlement which will contain in itself no provocations for future wars,

50 and which will constitute an alternative to Bolshevism, because it will commend itself to all reasonable opinion as a fair settlement of the European problem.

[...]

1 Polish Commission: refers to the members of the Polish National Committee present at the Paris Peace Conference who advocated the foundation of an independent Polish state.

2 chimera: a terrible or intimidating fabrication of the mind.

1.

2.

3.

Abiturprüfung 2021 – Geschichte bilingual-englisch, Grundkurs

Aufgabenstellung

Aufgabenstellung:

Analyse the text. (26 Punkte)

Explain the post-war economic, social and political conditions Judt mentions (16 Punkte) and present the reasons that led the USA to launch the Marshall Plan (12 Punkte). (28 Punkte)

With a focus on Germany's development, assess the claims made by Judt. (26 Punkte)

Hinweis: Weitere 20 Punkte werden für die Darstellungsleistung vergeben. Gesamtpunktzahl: 100 Punkte.

Materialgrundlage:

Tony Judt: Introduction. In: The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After, hrsg. von Martin Schain, New York 2001, S. 2 – 5.

(Rechtschreibung und Hervorhebungen wie im Original)

Hinweise zum Autor: Tony Judt (1948 – 2010) was a British-American historian, essayist and university professor who specialised in European history.

[...]

[T]he Marshall Plan did not come out of nowhere. It has a number of distinct contexts, which help explain both its origin and its objectives. By 1945 the collapse of Europe – first into depression, then war – had led many commentators to the conclusion that something quite new and different would be required if Europe (and therefore the world) were to break out of the cycle of economic stagnation and political frustration that had characterized the continent for the previous two decades. If another unsuccessful postwar era was to be avoided, and political extremists of all kind prevented from coming to power once again, democratic governments would need to take a quite different and more activist view of their capacities and responsibilities.

The experience of war contributed its own lessons. As in World War I, wartime governments had taken responsibility for economic mobilization, planning, controls, and the national direction of people and resources in ways that would hitherto have been unthinkable in time of peace. As a result, by 1945 there were many in Europe, by no means only on the Left, who took the view that the advantages of wartime planning and government intervention could translate into sustained peacetime administration. In Britain and France, as in Germany and the Benelux countries (though to a lesser extent in Italy) a new political and administrative elite was thus much more receptive to the sort of planning and cooperation that would be required of them by the Marshall Plan than would have been the case for their predecessors in an earlier generation.

But even if the old orthodoxies 1 had not taken such a beating at the hands of history, the postwar circumstances would in any case have paved the way for significant American involvement in European affairs. Like it or not, the West Europeans after 1945 needed the United States. [...]

The peculiarity of the Marshall Plan was rooted in the distinctive circumstances of its emergence. 1947 was a year of crisis throughout Europe. The steady onward march of Communism appeared to many to be inexorable. [...]

In the short term the achievement of the Marshall Plan is clear. The guarantees of aid from America, and American encouragement for the establishment of domestic and international agencies capable of putting that aid to good use, transformed first the expectations and then the institutions of Western Europe. Production increased, the financial stability of America’s West European partners improved, and before the end of the Plan all the major West European recipients of Marshall aid had exceeded their 1938 output levels and were already embarked upon the first stages of what we have come to see as the post-World War II era of sustained prosperity. [...]

It is a little harder to be quite so confident about the long-term effects of the Marshall Plan, at least upon the economy. Without any question the Plan brought the United States back into Europe in a quite unanticipated manner, and there it has remained ever since. How far this close interweaving of European and American concerns can be attributed to the Marshall Plan alone is a matter for legitimate debate. [...] But at the very least one can say that the European Recovery Program was a fundamental building block in the forging of this transatlantic relationship.

Similarly, the process whereby the continental states of Western Europe came together first to form a Coal and Steel Community (in 1951) and then, after 1955, to forge the European Economic Community and its successor institutions in Brussels is not directly attributable to anything undertaken or intended by planners in Washington. The origins of the European Coal and Steel Community lie as much in the domestic needs of France and the unusual circumstances of Germany as they do in American strategy. Nonetheless it remains true that the Americans were enthusiastic early proponents of European cooperation, and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was manifestly influential in forging habits of cross border discussion and information exchange that would have been altogether unthinkable before 1939.

Finally, the Marshall Plan helped divide Europe. This, of course, was far from being its intention (though there are grounds for believing that in offering Marshall aid to the Eastern half of Europe as well the Americans at least half-anticipated and perhaps hoped that it would be rejected). But because the Eastern half of Europe was constrained to reject the Marshall Plan, the tremendous injection of confidence and dollars that it represented was confined to Europe’s Western half, which thereby took a great leap ahead of the rest of the continent. [...] The Plan itself did not contribute by its design to the definitive drawing of Cold War lines in Europe, but its timing and implementation served to accentuate the significance of these divisions at a crucial moment.

[...]

1 Reference to pre-war economic thinking with regard to tackling economic crises: On the one hand deflation policy, counter-cyclical deficit financing on the other hand.

1.

2.

3.

Abiturprüfung 2021 · Geschichte bilingual-englisch, Grundkurs

Aufgabenstellung:

1.

Analyse the source. (26 Punkte)

2.

Explain the historical references found in the source (12 Punkte) and determine how the speaker views the US, the Soviet Union, and Europe (16 Punkte). (28 Punkte)

3.

Critically assess the statements made by Bush. (26 Punkte)

Note: Besides the content (80 points), a maximum of 20 points is given for language and presentation (Darstellungsleistung). Total: 100 points.

Materialgrundlage

George H. W. Bush: A whole Europe, a free Europe. Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, Rheingoldhalle Mainz, 31 May 1989. (Rechtschreibung und Hervorhebungen wie im Original)

1 [...] We must recall that the generation coming into its own in America and Western Europe is heir to gifts greater than those bestowed to any generation in history: peace, freedom, and prosperity.

This inheritance is possible because 40 years ago the nations of the West joined in that noble,

5 common cause called NATO. And first, first, there was the vision, the concept of free peoples in North America and Europe working to protect their values. And second, there was the practical sharing of risks and burdens and a realistic recognition of Soviet expansionism. And finally, there was the determination to look beyond old animosities. The NATO alliance did nothing less than provide a way for Western Europe to heal centuries – old rivalries, to begin

10 an era of reconciliation and restoration. It has been, in fact, a second Renaissance 1 of Europe.

As you know best, this is not just the 40th birthday of the alliance; it’s also the 40th birthday of the Federal Republic – a republic born in hope, tempered by challenge. And at the height of the Berlin crisis in 1948, Ernst Reuter 2 called on Germans to stand firm and confident, and you did – courageously, magnificently.

15 And the historic genius of the German people has flourished in this age of peace, and your nation has become a leader in technology – the fourth largest economy on Earth. But more important, you have inspired the world by forcefully promoting the principles of human rights, democracy, and freedom. The United States and the Federal Republic have always been firm friends and allies. But today we share an added role: partners in leadership.

20 Of course, leadership has a constant companion: responsibility. And our responsibility is to look ahead and grasp the promise of the future.

I said recently that we’re at the end of one era and at the beginning of another. And I noted that in regard to the Soviet Union, our policy is to move beyond containment.

For 40 years, the seeds of democracy in Eastern Europe lay dormant, buried under the frozen

25 tundra of the Cold War.

And for 40 years, the world has waited for the Cold War to end.

And decade after decade, time after time, the flowering human spirit withered from the chill of conflict and oppression.

And again, the world waited.

30 But the passion for freedom cannot be denied forever. The world has waited long enough. The time is right. Let Europe be whole and free.

To the founders of the alliance, this aspiration was a distant dream, and now it’s the new mission of NATO. If ancient rivals like Britain and France, or France and Germany, can reconcile, then why not the nations of the East and West?

35 In the East, brave men and women are showing us the way. Look at Poland, where Solidarity, Solidarnosc, and the Catholic Church have won legal status. The forces of freedom are putting the Soviet status quo on the defensive.

And in the West, we have succeeded because we’ve been faithful to our values and our vision. But, on the other side of the rusting Iron Curtain, their vision failed.

40 The Cold War began with the division of Europe. It can only end when Europe is whole.

[...] And as President, I will continue to do all I can to help open the closed societies of the East. We seek self-determination for all of Germany and all of Eastern Europe. And we will not relax, and we must not waver. Again, the world has waited long enough.

[...] Growing political freedom in the East, a Berlin without barriers, a cleaner environment,

45 a less militarized Europe – each is a noble goal. And taken together, they are the foundation of our larger vision: a Europe that is free and at peace with itself. So, let the Soviets know that our goal is not to undermine their legitimate security interests. Our goal is to convince them, step by step, that their definition of security is obsolete, that their deepest fears are unfounded.

When Western Europe takes its giant step in 1992, it will institutionalize what’s been true for

50 years: borders open to people, commerce, and ideas. No shadow of suspicion, no sinister fear is cast between you. The very prospect of war within the West is unthinkable to our citizens. But such a peaceful integration of nations into a world community does not mean that any nation must relinquish its culture, much less its sovereignty.

This process of integration, a subtle weaving of shared interests, which is so nearly complete

55 in Western Europe, has now finally begun in the East. We want to help the nations of Eastern Europe realize what we, the nations of Western Europe, learned long ago: The foundation of lasting security comes not from tanks, troops, or barbed wire; it is built on shared values and agreements that link free peoples.

[...] Forty years of Cold War have tested Western resolve and the strength of our values.

60 NATO’s first mission is now nearly complete. But if we are to fulfill our vision – our European vision – the challenges of the next 40 years will ask no less of us. Together, we shall answer the call. The world has waited long enough.

1 Renaissance: a period in European history covering the 15th and 16th centuries, characterized by a rediscovery of the antiquity and a new, humanist thinking leading to a flowering in e. g. art, architecture, politics, science and literature.

2 Ernst Reuter (1889 – 1953): mayor of West Berlin from 1948 to 1953.

1.

2.

3.