Abitur NRW Geschichte 2023 · GK · Haupttermin · bilingual Englisch

Aufgabenstellung:

1.

Analyse the text. (26 Punkte)

2.

Put the source into the historical setting of its time (14 Punkte) and present the “challenge and an opportunity of historic proportions” (ll. 54 f.) that Callaghan mentions in his speech (14 Punkte). (28 Punkte)

3.

Assess the views expressed by the author. (26 Punkte)

Materialgrundlage:

• Lord James Callaghan of Cardiff: Germany: Unification Prospect, Speech in the House of Lords on 17 th January 1990. (Rechtschreibung und Hervorhebungen wie im Original)

Hinweise zum Autor: Leonard James Callaghan, Baron Callaghan of Cardiff (1912 – 2005): a British Labour politician and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1976 – 1979). He was a member of Parliament (MP) from 1945 to 1987, subsequently being elevated to the House of Lords as a life peer.

1 [...] 1989 will go down in history with the revolutions for [sic!] 1789 and 1848 as a momentous year of hope, when men and women demanded freedom and seized democracy. Communism is discredited and the post-war Europe shaped by Potsdam and Yalta is in the process of dying. For the moment the people and not governments are making the running.

5 How will their revolutions go? In the short time which has elapsed we can see already that there are dangers as well as hope if nationalism, latent at the moment, runs wild and dangers too when people find that a revolution by itself is not enough to fill the shops.

8 As to divided Germany, the cold war between East and West has, for over 40 years, enabled us to put on one side any serious discussion about the shape and size of Germany or about reunification and also to close our eyes to its consequences. German leaders themselves have consistently told us that they could see no prospect of unification within their lifetime. However, today, as with so many other of the seemingly impossible changes which took place during 1989, the distant vision has suddenly become tomorrow’s reality. Indeed, in practical terms, the process of melding the two Germanys has already begun and will soon be in full swing. [...]

16 It goes without saying that, if a unified Germany is to have a healthy long-term future, it can only be brought into existence by the full consent of the German people expressed through the democratic process in both parts of Germany. Free elections with proper access to all the media and the opportunity for the opposition parties in East Germany to put their case are vital necessities. However, with that as a basis, if that is a basis and if the people of both Germanys decide that they wish to come together, not only will the coming together be inevitable but Germany will be the most powerful economic and political state in Europe.

23 Now that Western Europe is faced with that as a practical matter, instead of merely giving approval to a distant possibility as it has done in the past, there is some hesitation and nervousness, which is not surprising. However, in my view, Western Europe cannot step back at this late stage. Our task is not to thwart or delay the process. That is a course which would, in any event, be ineffective if the German people want unification. Our task is to ensure that the new constellation which takes its place will be an element for stability and security in the new Europe – a new Europe which is emerging now from the Atlantic to the Soviet borders.

31 German leaders of all parties there have shown themselves to be sensitive to that concern. They understand that a united Germany would have implications far beyond the new borders. However cautious the approach may be, neither they nor the rest of Europe can avoid providing answers to some overlapping questions of the highest importance.

35 Perhaps I may mention just two of those: the first is how to settle the eastern borders Of [sic!] a united Germany and the second how to satisfy the Soviet Union and Poland that their future security will be assured. I take it for granted that we are concerned about our own. [...] It is imperative that the two Germanys unequivocally and formally renounce any claim to recover their lost territories in the East and accept without reservation the existing border between East Germany and Poland. That must be enshrined in a treaty. [...]

42 Chancellor Kohl has defined the new relationship with East Germany as a “contractual community”. If that were to take the form of a federation with two separate states, two military commands and two separate armies, then the border between East and West Germany, on which NATO’s front line stands, would continue to provide a buffer. On the other hand, a fully unified Germany with a single government, one military command and its border extended to the Oder/Neisse line would not.

47 I suppose it is just possible to believe that two states in a confederal Germany might belong and could continue perhaps to belong to two different alliances, but I believe that before very long such an arrangement would prove to be quite unrealistic and would be abandoned. Nor is it conceivable that a totally united Germany – the most powerful, military, economic and political country in Europe as it would be – could be either neutral or unallied. If it were, it would be likely at some time in the future to feel hemmed in, and Europe has already had previous experience of where that sentiment can lead.

54 [...] it is surely beyond question that Europe faces both a challenge and an opportunity of historic proportions as great as any in the past. It appears to me that Mr. Gorbachev wishes to conduct a serious negotiation in order to reach a new equilibrium in Europe. We must test to the utmost whether that is so. Rarely has the situation been as fluid as it is today with all the possibilities of shaping a new course. We shall need to work very hard if we are to prevent the rise of narrow and destructive nationalisms or centuries old animosities from dividing and weakening us and indeed from diverting us from the very important new problems that will lie ahead of our continent in the 21st century. However, with vision and with vigour, the leaders of Europe have a rare opportunity – something that occurs only once in a lifetime – to establish a framework of understandings and agreements that could ensure for the people of Europe security and peaceful progress within a democratic society. [...]

1.

2.

3.

Abiturprüfung 2023 – Geschichte bilingual-englisch, Grundkurs

Aufgabenstellung:

1. Analyse the source. (26 Punkte)

2. Put the source in its historical context (12 Punkte) and explain the individual elements of the cartoon (16 Punkte). (28 Punkte)

3. Assess the view held by the cartoonist. (26 Punkte)

Note: A total of 20 additional points are awarded for clarity and quality of presentation (Darstellungsleistung). Total: 100 Punkte.

Materialgrundlage:

Wilhelm Wolpe: Le mur américain. In: Une semaine dans le monde. La vie politique, littéraire, économique et sociale. 04.10.1947, S. 1.

Hinweise zum Zeichner und zum Material:

Wilhelm Wolpe, alias Woop (1904 – 1958) was born in Germany. He participated in the French resistance during World War II and continued to live in France after the war.

From 1946 to 1948, Une semaine dans le monde was a weekly supplement of Le Monde. Le Monde still is one of the leading national newspapers in France.

Congress had the power of the purse and thus had to give its consent to the Marshall Plan. After the congressional election in 1946, the Republicans had the majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Arthur H. Vandenberg was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and in this position, he cooperated with the Truman administration and ensured bipartisan support for the Marshall Plan.

1.

2.

3.

Abiturprüfung 2023 – Geschichte bilingual-englisch, Grundkurs

Aufgabe 3

Materialgrundlage

Annika Mombauer: Germany’s Last Kaiser – Wilhelm II and political decision-making in Imperial Germany. In: New Perspective, Volume 4, No. 3, March 1999.

Hinweise zur Autorin und zum Material: Annika Mombauer (* 1967) is a Professor of Modern European History at the Open University in Milton Keynes (Great Britain). She specializes in 19th and 20th century European history with an emphasis on Imperial Germany and the origins of the First World War.

1 The history of Germany in the decades immediately preceding the First World War is closely linked to Germany’s last Kaiser, Wilhelm II. Owing to the peculiarities of the Prusso-German constitution, Wilhelm II, a person ill-equipped for leadership, yet with megalomaniac aspirations, found himself in 1888 acceding to one of the most powerful thrones of the time,

5 a position without any effective checks on his authority. His role in the events leading to war in 1914 is crucial for understanding the origins of the First World War, while his biography has fascinated his contemporaries and continues to fascinate countless historians. […]

8 Wilhelm’s fate and that of Germany were inextricably linked. The Kaiser has come to epitomise his long reign which has, quite aptly, become known as the Wilhelmine era. One

10 of the first significant actions of the new Kaiser, who acceded to the throne at the age of 29, was the dismissal of the long-serving and powerful Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1890. Under Wilhelm’s rule, Germany developed into one of the main powers in Europe and, abandoning the ‘Iron Chancellor’s’ complicated but effective system of alliances, attempted even to become the most powerful nation by striving for a position of hegemony in Europe

15 and ultimately worldwide. His rule ended with Germany’s collapse at the end of the worst war the world had ever seen. It was a war that the Kaiser had often advocated and that his bellicose 1 foreign policy had directly led to. Yet, when it came to it, he had shied away from the ultimate decision to go to war, and he could not have foreseen the extent of the carnage that he and his fellow officers were responsible for by unleashing war in 1914.

20 Already in his lifetime, Wilhelm’s contemporaries regarded him as an enigma. Commentators attributed to him immense powers and possibilities of decision-making and of ruling the country. However, they also commented on the Kaiser’s insistence on being personally involved in decisions on every level, his embarrassing diplomatic faux pas 2, his irate marginal notes 3 and ill-considered orders to his subordinates. In many ways, Wilhelm II was a terrible

25 liability to the political rulers of his time. […]

26 Wilhelm himself would certainly have agreed with those historians 4 who have come to rate his importance and influence highly. In May 1891, for example, he declared: ‘There is only one man in charge of the Reich, and I will not tolerate any other.’ The Kaiser considered his position to be that of the all-highest and ultimate decision-maker. His megalomaniac aspirations

30 are expressed forcefully in his following statement.

I have long ago made my programme of how I want to be German Kaiser, how I conceive of the German Kaiser: deep into the most distant jungles of other parts of the world, everyone should know the voice of the German Kaiser. Nothing should occur on this earth without having first heard him. His word must have its weight placed on every scale … Also domestically the word of the Kaiser should be everything. […]

36 Whenever questions of importance were discussed, Wilhelm turned to his military advisers. It was his opinion that the civilian decision-makers were ultimately dispensable, or that in any case they would lack courage to implement tough decisions. In the case of the infamous war council meeting of 8 December 1912 5, for example, the Kaiser did not invite any civilians

40 to the ad hoc 6 meeting that he convened at his castle during the diplomatic crisis brought about by the Balkan Wars. The exclusion of civilian decision-makers from this important meeting does not prove the relative unimportance of that event, as some historians would argue, but rather the contrary: it is precisely because the Kaiser attached such importance to the meeting that only those advisers whom he considered important were invited. ‘Mere’

45 civilians, even the Imperial Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, were simply to be informed of the outcome of the meeting and confronted with the decisions made. […]

47 What, then, was the Kaiser’s role in all this? It was he, ultimately, who had to sanction a decision to go to war, he who finally signed the relevant mobilisation orders, as he did in early August 1914. His tactless blunders on the international diplomatic stage did much to prepare

50 the ground for hostilities among the major European powers of the day, as did his expressed desire to achieve a position of world power for Germany. It is an unfortunate coincidence that the most powerful position in Germany was to be occupied by a megalomaniac monarch who was ultimately so ill-suited to occupying such an influential office. In the events leading to the outbreak of the war, the role of the Kaiser must therefore be seen as a crucial factor.

1 bellicose: aggressive, warlike

2 faux pas: blunder, literally ‘false step(s)’

3 The Emperor had a tendency to scribble notes in the margins of official dossiers and files.

4 Shortly before, the author refers to two different historical opinions on Emperor William II – one view is that William II was an ineffectual leader without great importance and the other view is that the Emperor was decisive and influential in his role as emperor.

5 The so-called war council was a meeting of Kaiser Wilhelm II and leading military and naval advisors in the context of the first Balkan war. They discussed the question whether Germany was prepared to wage war on Austria-Hungary’s side in case the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia escalated. The army favoured immediate action whereas the navy reacted with a fair amount of reserve.

6 ad hoc: improvised, unplanned

1.

Analyze the text. [26 Punkte]

2.

Drawing on the text, explain the long-term and short-term causes of the First World War (14 Punkte) and examine the way in which the author characterizes Emperor William II (14 Punkte). [28 Punkte]

3.

Assess Mombauer’s claim that “[i]n the events leading to the outbreak of the war, the role of the Kaiser must […] be seen as a crucial factor” (ll. 53 f.). [26 Punkte]