Abitur Hessen Geschichte 2021 · GK · bilingual Englisch

1

Outline Sanderson’s reasoning. (Material) (30 BE)

2

Explain the Anglo-German relationship from 1871 to 1914, taking Sanderson’s views into account. (40 BE)

3

Imagine Sanderson followed the negotiations for a peace treaty after the First World War. Write a letter to the British Foreign Office in which he reflects on the situation in Germany and consequences for the British, taking his pre-war ideas into account. (30 BE)

Material

Franz Neumann: Anti-Semitism – Spearhead of Universal Terror (1943)

Franz Neumann (1900–1954), a Social Democratic lawyer, emigrated from Germany in 1933 and later on served as an adviser to the US government in World War II. The text was written as an internal document for the US administration.

In one of the recent issues of Das Reich, Dr. Goebbels pledges the extermination of the Jews in the

East. The Voelkischer Beobachter in a recent issue equally threatens the complete extermination of the

Jews in Poland. The New York Herald Tribune of May 15, 1943, reports the complete liquidation of

the Warsaw ghetto, and a large number of reports indicate that the threats are being realized.

5 The most recent stage in the long process of the extermination of the Jews makes it mandatory to re-

examine the function of anti-Semitism within the framework of the Nazi system. Anti-Semitism has

been, from the very foundation of the Nazi Party, the most constant single ideology of the Nazi Party.

No other element has so constantly figured in the forefront of Nazi ideologies and Nazi activities. We

may, indeed, say that anti-Semitism is the sole ideology that can possibly cement the Nazi Party, and it

10 is this unique function of anti-Semitism that gives it its peculiar character. [...]

The expropriation of the Jews, for instance, is followed by that of the Poles, Czechs, Dutchmen,

Frenchmen, anti-Nazi Germans, and middle classes. Not only Jews are put into concentration camps

but pacifists, conservatives, Socialists, Catholics, Protestants, Free Thinkers, and members of the

occupied peoples. Not only Jews fall under the executioner’s ax but countless others of many races,

15 nationalities, beliefs, and religions. Anti-Semitism is thus the spearhead of terror. The Jews are used as

guinea pigs in testing a method of repression. It is, however, only the Jews who can possibly play this

role. National Socialism, which has allegedly abolished the class struggle, needs an enemy who, by his

very existence, can integrate the antagonistic groups within this society. This foe must not be too

weak. If he were too weak, one could not justify in the eyes of the peoples to make him the supreme

20 foe. He must clearly not be too strong because otherwise the Nazis would become involved in a

serious struggle with a powerful enemy. [...]

While anti-Semitism has thus been a constant and consistent policy of National Socialism, its

manifestations have changed considerably from 1933 to 1943. [...]

Persecution of the Jews, which is practiced at the order of the Nazis by ever larger strata 1 of the

25 German people, involves these strata in a collective guilt. The compulsion to commit so vast a crime

as the physical extermination of the Eastern Jews makes the German army, the civil service and large

masses perpetrators and accessories in the crime and makes it therefore impossible for them to leave

the Nazi boat. It is, I believe, safe to assume that the new wave of anit-Semitism is also intended to

make separate peace negotiations by non-Nazi members of the ruling class impossible. The Nazis

30 want them, each and every one of them, to be stained by the crime that is now being committed.

Franz Neumann: Anti-Semitism: Spearhead of Universal Terror, in: Raffaele Laudani (Hg.): Secret Reports on Nazi Germany. The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort, Princeton 2013, S. 27–30.

1 strata – Schichten

1

Summarize the text. (Material) (30 BE)

Material

Franz Neumann: Anti-Semitism – Spearhead of Universal Terror (1943)

Franz Neumann (1900–1954), a Social Democratic lawyer, emigrated from Germany in 1933 and later on served as an adviser to the US government in World War II. The text was written as an internal document for the US administration.

In one of the recent issues of Das Reich, Dr. Goebbels pledges the extermination of the Jews in the

East. The Voelkischer Beobachter in a recent issue equally threatens the complete extermination of the

Jews in Poland. The New York Herald Tribune of May 15, 1943, reports the complete liquidation of

the Warsaw ghetto, and a large number of reports indicate that the threats are being realized.

5 The most recent stage in the long process of the extermination of the Jews makes it mandatory to re-

examine the function of anti-Semitism within the framework of the Nazi system. Anti-Semitism has

been, from the very foundation of the Nazi Party, the most constant single ideology of the Nazi Party.

No other element has so constantly figured in the forefront of Nazi ideologies and Nazi activities. We

may, indeed, say that anti-Semitism is the sole ideology that can possibly cement the Nazi Party, and it

10 is this unique function of anti-Semitism that gives it its peculiar character. [...]

The expropriation of the Jews, for instance, is followed by that of the Poles, Czechs, Dutchmen,

Frenchmen, anti-Nazi Germans, and middle classes. Not only Jews are put into concentration camps

but pacifists, conservatives, Socialists, Catholics, Protestants, Free Thinkers, and members of the

occupied peoples. Not only Jews fall under the executioner’s ax but countless others of many races,

15 nationalities, beliefs, and religions. Anti-Semitism is thus the spearhead of terror. The Jews are used as

guinea pigs in testing a method of repression. It is, however, only the Jews who can possibly play this

role. National Socialism, which has allegedly abolished the class struggle, needs an enemy who, by his

very existence, can integrate the antagonistic groups within this society. This foe must not be too

weak. If he were too weak, one could not justify in the eyes of the peoples to make him the supreme

20 foe. He must clearly not be too strong because otherwise the Nazis would become involved in a

serious struggle with a powerful enemy. [...]

While anti-Semitism has thus been a constant and consistent policy of National Socialism, its

manifestations have changed considerably from 1933 to 1943. [...]

Persecution of the Jews, which is practiced at the order of the Nazis by ever larger strata 1 of the

25 German people, involves these strata in a collective guilt. The compulsion to commit so vast a crime

as the physical extermination of the Eastern Jews makes the German army, the civil service and large

masses perpetrators and accessories in the crime and makes it therefore impossible for them to leave

the Nazi boat. It is, I believe, safe to assume that the new wave of anit-Semitism is also intended to

make separate peace negotiations by non-Nazi members of the ruling class impossible. The Nazis

30 want them, each and every one of them, to be stained by the crime that is now being committed.

Franz Neumann: Anti-Semitism: Spearhead of Universal Terror, in: Raffaele Laudani (Hg.): Secret Reports on Nazi Germany. The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort, Princeton 2013, S. 27–30.

1 strata – Schichten

2

Neumann states that anti-Semitic “manifestations have changed considerably from 1933 to 1943” (Material). Explain that assumption. (40 BE)

Material

Franz Neumann: Anti-Semitism – Spearhead of Universal Terror (1943)

Franz Neumann (1900–1954), a Social Democratic lawyer, emigrated from Germany in 1933 and later on served as an adviser to the US government in World War II. The text was written as an internal document for the US administration.

In one of the recent issues of Das Reich, Dr. Goebbels pledges the extermination of the Jews in the

East. The Voelkischer Beobachter in a recent issue equally threatens the complete extermination of the

Jews in Poland. The New York Herald Tribune of May 15, 1943, reports the complete liquidation of

the Warsaw ghetto, and a large number of reports indicate that the threats are being realized.

5 The most recent stage in the long process of the extermination of the Jews makes it mandatory to re-

examine the function of anti-Semitism within the framework of the Nazi system. Anti-Semitism has

been, from the very foundation of the Nazi Party, the most constant single ideology of the Nazi Party.

No other element has so constantly figured in the forefront of Nazi ideologies and Nazi activities. We

may, indeed, say that anti-Semitism is the sole ideology that can possibly cement the Nazi Party, and it

10 is this unique function of anti-Semitism that gives it its peculiar character. [...]

The expropriation of the Jews, for instance, is followed by that of the Poles, Czechs, Dutchmen,

Frenchmen, anti-Nazi Germans, and middle classes. Not only Jews are put into concentration camps

but pacifists, conservatives, Socialists, Catholics, Protestants, Free Thinkers, and members of the

occupied peoples. Not only Jews fall under the executioner’s ax but countless others of many races,

15 nationalities, beliefs, and religions. Anti-Semitism is thus the spearhead of terror. The Jews are used as

guinea pigs in testing a method of repression. It is, however, only the Jews who can possibly play this

role. National Socialism, which has allegedly abolished the class struggle, needs an enemy who, by his

very existence, can integrate the antagonistic groups within this society. This foe must not be too

weak. If he were too weak, one could not justify in the eyes of the peoples to make him the supreme

20 foe. He must clearly not be too strong because otherwise the Nazis would become involved in a

serious struggle with a powerful enemy. [...]

While anti-Semitism has thus been a constant and consistent policy of National Socialism, its

manifestations have changed considerably from 1933 to 1943. [...]

Persecution of the Jews, which is practiced at the order of the Nazis by ever larger strata 1 of the

25 German people, involves these strata in a collective guilt. The compulsion to commit so vast a crime

as the physical extermination of the Eastern Jews makes the German army, the civil service and large

masses perpetrators and accessories in the crime and makes it therefore impossible for them to leave

the Nazi boat. It is, I believe, safe to assume that the new wave of anit-Semitism is also intended to

make separate peace negotiations by non-Nazi members of the ruling class impossible. The Nazis

30 want them, each and every one of them, to be stained by the crime that is now being committed.

Franz Neumann: Anti-Semitism: Spearhead of Universal Terror, in: Raffaele Laudani (Hg.): Secret Reports on Nazi Germany. The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort, Princeton 2013, S. 27–30.

1 strata – Schichten

3

Discuss to what extent matters of guilt and punishment of the Germans guided the policies of the victorious powers towards Germany after the end of World War II. (30 BE)

Material

House of Commons Debate: Foreign Affairs (1959)

In a debate in the British House of Commons on 19 February, 1959, ideas of the opposition and of the government concerning German reunification were expressed:

a) Hugh Gaitskell, Labour Party, Leader of the Opposition

After all, what is the attitude so far of the Western Powers on this vital issue of Germany? They have stood pat 1 in demanding German reunification with free elections […] and certainly have given the impression that free elections must be one of the very first steps to be taken before reunification [5] becomes at all possible. […]

Indeed, the real weakness of the point of view of the West in this matter is that they have failed to observe what must be—and I repeat it—a cardinal principle for both sides if they are serious about negotiations in this matter, namely, that the balance of security must not be upset. It is useless to deny that if we say to the Russians, "We want a reunified Germany which is free to join N.A.T.O.," if we [10] know—as we do know—that there is every prospect it would, in fact, join N.A.T.O., the inevitable result of reunification is to strengthen the West at the cost of the East. It means, in effect, that East Germany comes into the N.A.T.O. orbit. […]

Is it not better at this point to ask under what conditions the West could agree to this possible sacrifice, namely, the withdrawal of Germany from N.A.T.O.? That it is a sacrifice I have never denied for a [15] moment, but, as I think that only some sacrifice of this kind is likely to lead to, or be consistent with, reunification, it is better to ask the further question: under what conditions might we agree to it? […]

It is for this reason that we developed […] a plan for the establishment of a specific disarmament zone covering these five territories 2, with full controls, a plan for a mutual security pact, underwritten by the great Powers, and a plan for the withdrawal—if, as I think, this was a necessary price to pay—of [20] Germany from N.A.T.O. and of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Warsaw Pact.

b) David Ormsby-Gore, Conservative Party, Minister of State 3 for Foreign Affairs

For eleven years now we have sought to integrate Germany into the institutions of the West. We have also sought to bring about German reunification in freedom and to restore to her the full attributes of sovereignty, without which there is always the risk that the old grievances will begin to develop again. [25] This policy has kept the peace for eleven years. It would seem to us to be folly to destroy it simply for the sake of doing something new. […]

We have never insisted that a reunited Germany should join N.A.T.O. All that we have ever said is that a free nation should be free to decide its foreign policy. It is not our position that free elections throughout Germany must be the first step in any process leading to reunification and that acceptance [30] of this is a pre-condition for progress of any kind. Naturally, as the right hon. 4 Gentleman said, there must be free elections at some point, but there is room for negotiation about the exact point at which they should have to take place. […]

[A]fter generations of strife and jealousy between the countries of Western Europe, a new path towards unity and co-operation has been charted. Old rivalries have been laid aside, and Germany has [35] been welded into the community of Western Europe. We must ask ourselves whether it would really be wise to reverse this process. Would it be wise to prise 5 Germany apart from her present friends and Allies, and so begin a new and unpredictable chapter in our history?

I cannot feel that this would be a hopeful development and, above all, I would have the most fundamental doubts about a policy that involved the prospect both of American withdrawal from [40] Europe and German isolation from her Western European partners. I would, therefore, suggest that we would be making a grave mistake if we sought for a short cut to German reunification and Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe by means fraught with such tremendous risks.

1 to stand pat – einen unveränderlichen Standpunkt vertreten

2 The five territories are: the FRG, the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

3 Minister of State – Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär

4 right honourable Gentleman – Anrede für Abgeordnetenkollegen

5 to prise apart – auseinanderbringen

House of Commons Debate on Foreign Affairs, 1959, URL: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/feb/19/foreign-affairs (abgerufen am 24.09.2020).

1 Summarize the statements by Gaitskell and Ormsby-Gore. (Material) [30 BE]

Material

House of Commons Debate: Foreign Affairs (1959)

In a debate in the British House of Commons on 19 February, 1959, ideas of the opposition and of the government concerning German reunification were expressed:

a) Hugh Gaitskell, Labour Party, Leader of the Opposition

After all, what is the attitude so far of the Western Powers on this vital issue of Germany? They have stood pat 1 in demanding German reunification with free elections […] and certainly have given the impression that free elections must be one of the very first steps to be taken before reunification [5] becomes at all possible. […]

Indeed, the real weakness of the point of view of the West in this matter is that they have failed to observe what must be—and I repeat it—a cardinal principle for both sides if they are serious about negotiations in this matter, namely, that the balance of security must not be upset. It is useless to deny that if we say to the Russians, "We want a reunified Germany which is free to join N.A.T.O.," if we [10] know—as we do know—that there is every prospect it would, in fact, join N.A.T.O., the inevitable result of reunification is to strengthen the West at the cost of the East. It means, in effect, that East Germany comes into the N.A.T.O. orbit. […]

Is it not better at this point to ask under what conditions the West could agree to this possible sacrifice, namely, the withdrawal of Germany from N.A.T.O.? That it is a sacrifice I have never denied for a [15] moment, but, as I think that only some sacrifice of this kind is likely to lead to, or be consistent with, reunification, it is better to ask the further question: under what conditions might we agree to it? […]

It is for this reason that we developed […] a plan for the establishment of a specific disarmament zone covering these five territories 2, with full controls, a plan for a mutual security pact, underwritten by the great Powers, and a plan for the withdrawal—if, as I think, this was a necessary price to pay—of [20] Germany from N.A.T.O. and of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Warsaw Pact.

b) David Ormsby-Gore, Conservative Party, Minister of State 3 for Foreign Affairs

For eleven years now we have sought to integrate Germany into the institutions of the West. We have also sought to bring about German reunification in freedom and to restore to her the full attributes of sovereignty, without which there is always the risk that the old grievances will begin to develop again. [25] This policy has kept the peace for eleven years. It would seem to us to be folly to destroy it simply for the sake of doing something new. […]

We have never insisted that a reunited Germany should join N.A.T.O. All that we have ever said is that a free nation should be free to decide its foreign policy. It is not our position that free elections throughout Germany must be the first step in any process leading to reunification and that acceptance [30] of this is a pre-condition for progress of any kind. Naturally, as the right hon. 4 Gentleman said, there must be free elections at some point, but there is room for negotiation about the exact point at which they should have to take place. […]

[A]fter generations of strife and jealousy between the countries of Western Europe, a new path towards unity and co-operation has been charted. Old rivalries have been laid aside, and Germany has [35] been welded into the community of Western Europe. We must ask ourselves whether it would really be wise to reverse this process. Would it be wise to prise 5 Germany apart from her present friends and Allies, and so begin a new and unpredictable chapter in our history?

I cannot feel that this would be a hopeful development and, above all, I would have the most fundamental doubts about a policy that involved the prospect both of American withdrawal from [40] Europe and German isolation from her Western European partners. I would, therefore, suggest that we would be making a grave mistake if we sought for a short cut to German reunification and Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe by means fraught with such tremendous risks.

1 to stand pat – einen unveränderlichen Standpunkt vertreten

2 The five territories are: the FRG, the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

3 Minister of State – Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär

4 right honourable Gentleman – Anrede für Abgeordnetenkollegen

5 to prise apart – auseinanderbringen

House of Commons Debate on Foreign Affairs, 1959, URL: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/feb/19/foreign-affairs (abgerufen am 24.09.2020).

Ormsby-Gore points out: “Old rivalries have been laid aside, and Germany has been welded into the community of Western Europe.” (Material). Explain what is meant by “old rivalries” between Germany and Western Europe.

2.1 Refer to the time from 1890 to 1914. [40 BE]

Material

House of Commons Debate: Foreign Affairs (1959)

In a debate in the British House of Commons on 19 February, 1959, ideas of the opposition and of the government concerning German reunification were expressed:

a) Hugh Gaitskell, Labour Party, Leader of the Opposition

After all, what is the attitude so far of the Western Powers on this vital issue of Germany? They have stood pat 1 in demanding German reunification with free elections […] and certainly have given the impression that free elections must be one of the very first steps to be taken before reunification [5] becomes at all possible. […]

Indeed, the real weakness of the point of view of the West in this matter is that they have failed to observe what must be—and I repeat it—a cardinal principle for both sides if they are serious about negotiations in this matter, namely, that the balance of security must not be upset. It is useless to deny that if we say to the Russians, "We want a reunified Germany which is free to join N.A.T.O.," if we [10] know—as we do know—that there is every prospect it would, in fact, join N.A.T.O., the inevitable result of reunification is to strengthen the West at the cost of the East. It means, in effect, that East Germany comes into the N.A.T.O. orbit. […]

Is it not better at this point to ask under what conditions the West could agree to this possible sacrifice, namely, the withdrawal of Germany from N.A.T.O.? That it is a sacrifice I have never denied for a [15] moment, but, as I think that only some sacrifice of this kind is likely to lead to, or be consistent with, reunification, it is better to ask the further question: under what conditions might we agree to it? […]

It is for this reason that we developed […] a plan for the establishment of a specific disarmament zone covering these five territories 2, with full controls, a plan for a mutual security pact, underwritten by the great Powers, and a plan for the withdrawal—if, as I think, this was a necessary price to pay—of [20] Germany from N.A.T.O. and of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Warsaw Pact.

b) David Ormsby-Gore, Conservative Party, Minister of State 3 for Foreign Affairs

For eleven years now we have sought to integrate Germany into the institutions of the West. We have also sought to bring about German reunification in freedom and to restore to her the full attributes of sovereignty, without which there is always the risk that the old grievances will begin to develop again. [25] This policy has kept the peace for eleven years. It would seem to us to be folly to destroy it simply for the sake of doing something new. […]

We have never insisted that a reunited Germany should join N.A.T.O. All that we have ever said is that a free nation should be free to decide its foreign policy. It is not our position that free elections throughout Germany must be the first step in any process leading to reunification and that acceptance [30] of this is a pre-condition for progress of any kind. Naturally, as the right hon. 4 Gentleman said, there must be free elections at some point, but there is room for negotiation about the exact point at which they should have to take place. […]

[A]fter generations of strife and jealousy between the countries of Western Europe, a new path towards unity and co-operation has been charted. Old rivalries have been laid aside, and Germany has [35] been welded into the community of Western Europe. We must ask ourselves whether it would really be wise to reverse this process. Would it be wise to prise 5 Germany apart from her present friends and Allies, and so begin a new and unpredictable chapter in our history?

I cannot feel that this would be a hopeful development and, above all, I would have the most fundamental doubts about a policy that involved the prospect both of American withdrawal from [40] Europe and German isolation from her Western European partners. I would, therefore, suggest that we would be making a grave mistake if we sought for a short cut to German reunification and Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe by means fraught with such tremendous risks.

1 to stand pat – einen unveränderlichen Standpunkt vertreten

2 The five territories are: the FRG, the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

3 Minister of State – Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär

4 right honourable Gentleman – Anrede für Abgeordnetenkollegen

5 to prise apart – auseinanderbringen

House of Commons Debate on Foreign Affairs, 1959, URL: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/feb/19/foreign-affairs (abgerufen am 24.09.2020).

Ormsby-Gore points out: “Old rivalries have been laid aside, and Germany has been welded into the community of Western Europe.” (Material). Explain what is meant by “old rivalries” between Germany and Western Europe.

2.2 Refer to the time from 1933 to 1939. [40 BE]

Material

House of Commons Debate: Foreign Affairs (1959)

In a debate in the British House of Commons on 19 February, 1959, ideas of the opposition and of the government concerning German reunification were expressed:

a) Hugh Gaitskell, Labour Party, Leader of the Opposition

After all, what is the attitude so far of the Western Powers on this vital issue of Germany? They have stood pat 1 in demanding German reunification with free elections […] and certainly have given the impression that free elections must be one of the very first steps to be taken before reunification [5] becomes at all possible. […]

Indeed, the real weakness of the point of view of the West in this matter is that they have failed to observe what must be—and I repeat it—a cardinal principle for both sides if they are serious about negotiations in this matter, namely, that the balance of security must not be upset. It is useless to deny that if we say to the Russians, "We want a reunified Germany which is free to join N.A.T.O.," if we [10] know—as we do know—that there is every prospect it would, in fact, join N.A.T.O., the inevitable result of reunification is to strengthen the West at the cost of the East. It means, in effect, that East Germany comes into the N.A.T.O. orbit. […]

Is it not better at this point to ask under what conditions the West could agree to this possible sacrifice, namely, the withdrawal of Germany from N.A.T.O.? That it is a sacrifice I have never denied for a [15] moment, but, as I think that only some sacrifice of this kind is likely to lead to, or be consistent with, reunification, it is better to ask the further question: under what conditions might we agree to it? […]

It is for this reason that we developed […] a plan for the establishment of a specific disarmament zone covering these five territories 2, with full controls, a plan for a mutual security pact, underwritten by the great Powers, and a plan for the withdrawal—if, as I think, this was a necessary price to pay—of [20] Germany from N.A.T.O. and of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Warsaw Pact.

b) David Ormsby-Gore, Conservative Party, Minister of State 3 for Foreign Affairs

For eleven years now we have sought to integrate Germany into the institutions of the West. We have also sought to bring about German reunification in freedom and to restore to her the full attributes of sovereignty, without which there is always the risk that the old grievances will begin to develop again. [25] This policy has kept the peace for eleven years. It would seem to us to be folly to destroy it simply for the sake of doing something new. […]

We have never insisted that a reunited Germany should join N.A.T.O. All that we have ever said is that a free nation should be free to decide its foreign policy. It is not our position that free elections throughout Germany must be the first step in any process leading to reunification and that acceptance [30] of this is a pre-condition for progress of any kind. Naturally, as the right hon. 4 Gentleman said, there must be free elections at some point, but there is room for negotiation about the exact point at which they should have to take place. […]

[A]fter generations of strife and jealousy between the countries of Western Europe, a new path towards unity and co-operation has been charted. Old rivalries have been laid aside, and Germany has [35] been welded into the community of Western Europe. We must ask ourselves whether it would really be wise to reverse this process. Would it be wise to prise 5 Germany apart from her present friends and Allies, and so begin a new and unpredictable chapter in our history?

I cannot feel that this would be a hopeful development and, above all, I would have the most fundamental doubts about a policy that involved the prospect both of American withdrawal from [40] Europe and German isolation from her Western European partners. I would, therefore, suggest that we would be making a grave mistake if we sought for a short cut to German reunification and Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe by means fraught with such tremendous risks.

1 to stand pat – einen unveränderlichen Standpunkt vertreten

2 The five territories are: the FRG, the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

3 Minister of State – Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär

4 right honourable Gentleman – Anrede für Abgeordnetenkollegen

5 to prise apart – auseinanderbringen

House of Commons Debate on Foreign Affairs, 1959, URL: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/feb/19/foreign-affairs (abgerufen am 24.09.2020).

3 Imagine you are a West German journalist of the late 1950s. Write an article for a British newspaper, commenting on the House of Commons debate (Material), supporting or opposing the policies of the Adenauer government. [30 BE]

Material

Lord Callaghan: Prospect of German Unification (1990)

James Callaghan (1912–2005) was the leader of the Labour Party 1976–1980 and British Prime Minister 1976–1979. He gave this speech to the House of Lords on 17 January, 1990.

The extraordinary events of recent months have already overturned a political structure in Europe which has been settled for almost the past half century. I submit that 1989 will go down in history with the revolutions for 1789 and 1848 as a momentous year of hope, when men and women demanded freedom and seized democracy. Communism is discredited and the post-war Europe shaped by 5 Potsdam and Yalta is in the process of dying. For the moment the people and not governments are making the running. […]

As to divided Germany, the cold war between East and West has, for over 40 years, enabled us to put on one side any serious discussion about the shape and size of Germany or about reunification and also to close our eyes to its consequences. German leaders themselves have consistently told us that 10 they could see no prospect of unification within their lifetime. However, today, as with so many other of the seemingly impossible changes which took place during 1989, the distant vision has suddenly become tomorrow’s reality. Indeed, in practical terms, the process of melding 1 the two Germanys has already begun and will soon be in full swing. […]

Now that Western Europe is faced with that as a practical matter, instead of merely giving approval to 15 a distant possibility as it has done in the past, there is some hesitation and nervousness, which is not surprising. However, in my view, Western Europe cannot step back at this late stage. Our task is not to thwart 2 or delay the process. That is a course which would, in any event, be ineffective if the German people want unification. Our task is to ensure that the new constellation which takes its place will be an element for stability and security in the new Europe – a new Europe which is emerging now from 20 the Atlantic to the Soviet borders. […]

It is imperative that the two Germanys unequivocally 3 and formally renounce any claim to recover their lost territories in the East and accept without reservation the existing border between East Germany and Poland. That must be enshrined 4 in a treaty. Even with that essential step completed, the security implications for the Soviet Union are vast. That empire has never made any bones 5 about 25 regarding East Germany and Poland as buffers against attack from the West. […]

I suppose it is just possible to believe that two states in a confederal 6 Germany might belong and could continue perhaps to belong to two different alliances, but I believe that before very long such an arrangement would prove to be quite unrealistic and would be abandoned. Nor is it conceivable that a totally united Germany – the most powerful, military, economic and political country in Europe as it 30 would be – could be either neutral or unallied. If it were, it would be likely at some time in the future to feel hemmed 7 in, and Europe has already had previous experience of where that sentiment can lead. [… W]ith vision and with vigour, the leaders of Europe have a rare opportunity – something that occurs only once in a lifetime – to establish a framework of understandings and agreements that could ensure for the people of Europe security and peaceful progress within a democratic society.

Lord Callaghan: Germany: Unification Prospect, 17.01.1990, URL: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1990/jan/17/germany-unification-prospect#S5LV0514P0_19900117_HOL_106 (abgerufen am 09.04.2016).

1 to meld – vereinen

2 to thwart – durchkreuzen, vereiteln

3 unequivocally – unzweideutig

4 to enshrine – bewahren

5 to make no bones about – keinen Hehl aus etwas machen, etwas nicht verheimlichen

6 confederal – staatenbündisch (d. h. bei Aufrechterhaltung der Souveränität der Teilstaaten)

7 to hem in – einengen

Great Britain and the Reunification of Germany

1

Outline the author's reasoning. (Material) (30 BE)

Material

Lord Callaghan: Prospect of German Unification (1990)

James Callaghan (1912–2005) was the leader of the Labour Party 1976–1980 and British Prime Minister 1976–1979. He gave this speech to the House of Lords on 17 January, 1990.

The extraordinary events of recent months have already overturned a political structure in Europe which has been settled for almost the past half century. I submit that 1989 will go down in history with the revolutions for 1789 and 1848 as a momentous year of hope, when men and women demanded freedom and seized democracy. Communism is discredited and the post-war Europe shaped by 5 Potsdam and Yalta is in the process of dying. For the moment the people and not governments are making the running. […]

As to divided Germany, the cold war between East and West has, for over 40 years, enabled us to put on one side any serious discussion about the shape and size of Germany or about reunification and also to close our eyes to its consequences. German leaders themselves have consistently told us that 10 they could see no prospect of unification within their lifetime. However, today, as with so many other of the seemingly impossible changes which took place during 1989, the distant vision has suddenly become tomorrow’s reality. Indeed, in practical terms, the process of melding 1 the two Germanys has already begun and will soon be in full swing. […]

Now that Western Europe is faced with that as a practical matter, instead of merely giving approval to 15 a distant possibility as it has done in the past, there is some hesitation and nervousness, which is not surprising. However, in my view, Western Europe cannot step back at this late stage. Our task is not to thwart 2 or delay the process. That is a course which would, in any event, be ineffective if the German people want unification. Our task is to ensure that the new constellation which takes its place will be an element for stability and security in the new Europe – a new Europe which is emerging now from 20 the Atlantic to the Soviet borders. […]

It is imperative that the two Germanys unequivocally 3 and formally renounce any claim to recover their lost territories in the East and accept without reservation the existing border between East Germany and Poland. That must be enshrined 4 in a treaty. Even with that essential step completed, the security implications for the Soviet Union are vast. That empire has never made any bones 5 about 25 regarding East Germany and Poland as buffers against attack from the West. […]

I suppose it is just possible to believe that two states in a confederal 6 Germany might belong and could continue perhaps to belong to two different alliances, but I believe that before very long such an arrangement would prove to be quite unrealistic and would be abandoned. Nor is it conceivable that a totally united Germany – the most powerful, military, economic and political country in Europe as it 30 would be – could be either neutral or unallied. If it were, it would be likely at some time in the future to feel hemmed 7 in, and Europe has already had previous experience of where that sentiment can lead. [… W]ith vision and with vigour, the leaders of Europe have a rare opportunity – something that occurs only once in a lifetime – to establish a framework of understandings and agreements that could ensure for the people of Europe security and peaceful progress within a democratic society.

Lord Callaghan: Germany: Unification Prospect, 17.01.1990, URL: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1990/jan/17/germany-unification-prospect#S5LV0514P0_19900117_HOL_106 (abgerufen am 09.04.2016).

1 to meld – vereinen

2 to thwart – durchkreuzen, vereiteln

3 unequivocally – unzweideutig

4 to enshrine – bewahren

5 to make no bones about – keinen Hehl aus etwas machen, etwas nicht verheimlichen

6 confederal – staatenbündisch (d. h. bei Aufrechterhaltung der Souveränität der Teilstaaten)

7 to hem in – einengen

Great Britain and the Reunification of Germany

2

Explain the way to the reunification of Germany from 1989 to 1990 and put the source (Material) into its context. (40 BE)

Material

Lord Callaghan: Prospect of German Unification (1990)

James Callaghan (1912–2005) was the leader of the Labour Party 1976–1980 and British Prime Minister 1976–1979. He gave this speech to the House of Lords on 17 January, 1990.

The extraordinary events of recent months have already overturned a political structure in Europe which has been settled for almost the past half century. I submit that 1989 will go down in history with the revolutions for 1789 and 1848 as a momentous year of hope, when men and women demanded freedom and seized democracy. Communism is discredited and the post-war Europe shaped by 5 Potsdam and Yalta is in the process of dying. For the moment the people and not governments are making the running. […]

As to divided Germany, the cold war between East and West has, for over 40 years, enabled us to put on one side any serious discussion about the shape and size of Germany or about reunification and also to close our eyes to its consequences. German leaders themselves have consistently told us that 10 they could see no prospect of unification within their lifetime. However, today, as with so many other of the seemingly impossible changes which took place during 1989, the distant vision has suddenly become tomorrow’s reality. Indeed, in practical terms, the process of melding 1 the two Germanys has already begun and will soon be in full swing. […]

Now that Western Europe is faced with that as a practical matter, instead of merely giving approval to 15 a distant possibility as it has done in the past, there is some hesitation and nervousness, which is not surprising. However, in my view, Western Europe cannot step back at this late stage. Our task is not to thwart 2 or delay the process. That is a course which would, in any event, be ineffective if the German people want unification. Our task is to ensure that the new constellation which takes its place will be an element for stability and security in the new Europe – a new Europe which is emerging now from 20 the Atlantic to the Soviet borders. […]

It is imperative that the two Germanys unequivocally 3 and formally renounce any claim to recover their lost territories in the East and accept without reservation the existing border between East Germany and Poland. That must be enshrined 4 in a treaty. Even with that essential step completed, the security implications for the Soviet Union are vast. That empire has never made any bones 5 about 25 regarding East Germany and Poland as buffers against attack from the West. […]

I suppose it is just possible to believe that two states in a confederal 6 Germany might belong and could continue perhaps to belong to two different alliances, but I believe that before very long such an arrangement would prove to be quite unrealistic and would be abandoned. Nor is it conceivable that a totally united Germany – the most powerful, military, economic and political country in Europe as it 30 would be – could be either neutral or unallied. If it were, it would be likely at some time in the future to feel hemmed 7 in, and Europe has already had previous experience of where that sentiment can lead. [… W]ith vision and with vigour, the leaders of Europe have a rare opportunity – something that occurs only once in a lifetime – to establish a framework of understandings and agreements that could ensure for the people of Europe security and peaceful progress within a democratic society.

Lord Callaghan: Germany: Unification Prospect, 17.01.1990, URL: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1990/jan/17/germany-unification-prospect#S5LV0514P0_19900117_HOL_106 (abgerufen am 09.04.2016).

1 to meld – vereinen

2 to thwart – durchkreuzen, vereiteln

3 unequivocally – unzweideutig

4 to enshrine – bewahren

5 to make no bones about – keinen Hehl aus etwas machen, etwas nicht verheimlichen

6 confederal – staatenbündisch (d. h. bei Aufrechterhaltung der Souveränität der Teilstaaten)

7 to hem in – einengen

Great Britain and the Reunification of Germany

3

Assess to what extent the German Revolution of 1848/49 can be called an event "when men and women demanded freedom and seized democracy." (Material) (30 BE)