Ejercicio 4 (a-b, g-h) - Risc moral, relació d'agència i in… · Economia de L'empresa UPF 2016
Tema: Informació asimètrica: selecció adversa, risc moral i relació d'agència · Del examen Final Exam - Business Economics (December 2016) (2016)
Enunciado
4. Questions 25-32: Agency theory, adverse selection, and moral hazard
Select the single correct answer for each of the following multiple-choice questions:
a.
Pepa hires Pepe to assist her in designing corporate web pages requiring meticulous attention to client specifications. Pepa experiences motivation costs because:
.
b.
How should an organization optimally address an agency problem under moral hazard?
.
g.
Which scenario represents an example of moral hazard?
.
h.
Which policy measure effectively reduces moral hazard problems in the banking industry?
.
Solución
Según los criterios oficiales de corrección
a. Pepa hires Pepe to assist her in designing corporate web pages requiring meticulous attention to client specifications. Pepa experiences motivation costs because:
Solución: 3. Pepe spends excessive working time on artistic flourishes and submits projects past deadlines.
b. How should an organization optimally address an agency problem under moral hazard?
Solución: 4. Increase supervisory controls up to the margin where the cost of additional safeguards equals the marginal reduction in residual loss.
g. Which scenario represents an example of moral hazard?
Solución: 3. Individuals engaging in riskier lifestyle actions because their losses are covered by an insurance policy.
h. Which policy measure effectively reduces moral hazard problems in the banking industry?
Solución: 3. Tying bank executives' compensation packages to the long-term stock market valuation of the bank.
La explicación paso a paso, hecha con IA, es Premium. Premium
Resuélvelo aquí mismo: corrección automática, pistas y solución paso a paso.
‹ Pregunta 5 · 2021 · Ejercicio 4 (c-f) - Selecció adversa i senyalització · 2016 ›